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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PETER McKELLAR, MARY HELEN PARSONS, JAMES LESLIE McKELLER,
CHARLES McKELLAR and GLEN McKELLAR,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs-

Case no.
11456

NELLIE McKELLAR,

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This action was initiated by the Appellants (Plaintiffs below) against Nellie McKellar, Respondent (Defendant below)
in an attempt to set aside a deed which was executed in favor
of the Respondent and her deceased husband on May 5, 1947,
and which was duly recorded at the Office of the Tooele ·
County Recorder. Appellants' action was based upon the
theory that a mistake had been committed by the grantors of
the property. The Respondent defended upon the grounds that
the conveyance was valid and also on the ground that if a
mistake had been committed, the Appellants were barred by
the Statute of Limitations, Section 78-12-26 (3), Utah Code
Annotated, 19 53, which limits the time for bringing an action
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for fraud or mistake to three years. The Respondent counterclaimed for summary judgment based upon this statute and
also upon the ground that the Respondent had acquired rhe
land under the "Adverse Possession Rule," pursuant to statute.
The Appellants subsequently amended their complaint alleging that the mistake had been committed by a trustee and
again the Respondent defended upon the grounds that an action
to set aside a document based upon mistake or fraud was
barred by the Statute of Limitations.
DISPOSITION AT THE LOWER COURT
Respondent moved for summary judgment in the Lower
Court on the basis that no issues of law or fact remained to be
determined by trial and the Lower Court granted the Respondent's motion and quieted title to the property in the
name of the Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks the affirmation of the Lower Court's
judgment.
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent is a sister-in-law of the Appellants. On
December 17, 1942, Mary McKellar, the mother of the Appellants and the of the Respondent's husband conveyed to two o±
her children the land in dispute in this action. The deed from
the mother to the two children was executed simultaneously
with a separate agreement, which required the consent of twothirds of all of the children if and when the property was to
be reconveyed, sold, transferred, or otherwise encumbered. The
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deed from the mother to the two daughters was recorded at
the Office of the Tooele County Recorder on August 20, 1945.
The agreement between the mother and the two daughters
which was executed simultaneously with the deed was recorded
on January 25, 1951.
On May 5, 1947, the two daughters, Mary Helen Parsons
and Montella McKellar Dick, by Warranty Deed which recited the consideration of Ten Dollars ( $10.00) conveyed to
Frank McKellar and the Respondent, Nellie McKellar, as husband and wife, the land in dispute in this action. Since that
date, the Respondent and her husband, Frank McKellar, now
deceased, have been ~.1 actual possession of said land and have
fenced and improved the land by cultivation and have paid
the taxes assessed by the Tooele County Assessor's Office. The
Appellants brought an action twenty-one years after the conveyance in question, to set aside said conveyance from the
two sisters to the Respondent and her deceased husband and
base such action on the theory that a mistake had been committed by Mary Helen Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick
in conveying the land in dispute to the Respondent and her
deceased husband.
The Respondent answered alleging that the conveyance
was a bona-fide conveyance in that the Appellants released,
consented to, and ratified the transaction between the two
sisters and the Respondent and her deceased husband by a document entitled "Release and Consent," dated June 20, 1953, and
recorded July 3, 19 53, signed by all of the Appellants. Moreover, the Respondent affirmatively pled as a defense the Statute
of Limitations for fraud and mistake pursuant to Section 7812-26 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, which limits the time
for bringing an action for fraud or mistake to three years. As
.m additional affirmative defense, the Respondent has pied the
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seven years Statute of Limitations for adverse possession. The
Respondent has further counter-claimed upon the adverse
possession and at the hearing for the motion for summary judgment introduced evidence as to its color of title and further
showed that she had been in open and hostile possession for a
period of twenty-one years and that the Respondent or her
deceased husband had paid all of the taxes during those years
and further fenced and improved the land by cultivation.
RESPONDENT'S POSITION
The Trial Court's judgment should be affirmed for the
following reasons:
( 1) The conveyance was a bona-fide conveyance
since all of the Appellants released, consented to, and
ratified the conveyance complained of.
The Respondents obtained the land by adverse
possession.
( 2)

( 3) The Appellants' action, based upon mistake, is
barred by the Statute of Limitations pursuant to Section 78-12-26 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONVEYANCE WAS A BONA-FIDE CONVEYANCE SINCE ALL OF THE APPELLANTS RELEASED, CONSENTED TO, AND RATIFIED THE CONVEYANCE COMPLAINED OF.
The pleadings show that there is no dispute as to the
Warranty Deed between the mother and the two daughters or
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as to the agreement which was executed simultaneously with
that Warranty Deed, and there is no dispute as to the dates
of the filing of said documents. Similarly, there are no disputes
as to the Warranty Deed executed by the two sisters in favor
of the Respondent and her deceased husband or the dates of
filing of said document.
The Respondent, at a hearing for its motion
judgment, introduced into evidence a document
lease and Consent" which document was signed
Appellants to this action, a part of which reads

for summary
entitled "Reby all of the
as follows:

"Know All Men by the5c Presents
That we, the undersigned being legal heirs of
John M. McKellar, deceased, and Mary McKellar, deceased, husband and wife, and being beneficiaries
under the terms of that certain agreement between
Mary McKellar, and Mary Helen McKellar Parsons,
and Montella McKellar Dick, dated December 17,
1942, and recorded Jmuary 25, 1951, in Book 'F' of
Bonds and Agreements at Pages 9 3- 5, do hereby unconditionally consent and agree that Frank McKellar,
a beneficiary, named in said agreement may proceed
with the sale and conveyance of any and all real property involved by the terms of said agreement or involved in the Warranty Deed from Mary McKellar to
Mary Helen McKellar Parsons and Mary McKellar
Dick dated December 17, 1942, and recorded August
20, 1945, in Book '4-A' of Deeds at Page 58 8 in Tooele
County Recorder's Office, and in which any of the
undersigned heirs of said deceased persons may have an
interest. (Emphasis added)
The "Release and Consent," a portion of which was
quoted above, was signed by Mary McKellar Dick, Peter Mc-
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Kellar, Mary Helen McKellar Parsons,

J.

Leslie McKellar, Joseph

G. McKellar, Charles A. McKellar, and Glen E. McKcllar, ar.d
includes all of the Appellants who brought the present action.
The release was properly executed, acknowledged, and notarized
on June 3, 1953, and was recorded on July 3, 1953.
It is obviously by the terms of that "Release and Consent"

that at least two-thirds of the heirs released and consented to

any and all conveyances of any and all of the lands described
in the original deed which was .conveyed from the mother of
the parties to the two daughtns and from the two daughters

to the Respondent and her husband. Although prior approval
may not have been obtained for the conveyance of the property
from the two daughters to the Respondent and her husband by
the "Release and Consent" cited above, all of the heirs and all
of the Appellants ratified the conveyance and should be bound
by such ratification.
The Appellants argue, however, that either an actual or
constructive trust was created although none of the documents
in question or in evidence show any intent of appointing the
Respondent or her deceased husband as alternative trustees for
the rest of the heirs. In support of their contention, the Appellants cite a statement of law relating to circumstances involving che wrongful conversion of property by the appointed fiduciary. The Respondent was a bona-fide purchaser from the fiduciaries in this case and if the terms of the trust agreement were
not met in the first instance, the "Release and Consent" signed
and recorded subsequently sufficed to correct any earlier defects in the conveyance. The Respondent or her deceased husband never <lcted in any fiduciary capacity for the other heirs.
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POINT II
THE RESPONDENT OBTAINED THE LAND BY
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The Respondent by her counter-claim is entitled to have
the property quieted in her through adverse possession. By her
counter-claim, the Respondent pled that she has been in open
hostile and adverse possession of the property in question for
more than twenty-one years in that she and her deceased
husband have paid the taxes pursuant to statute for the entire
duration of their possession of the property. The pleadings show
that the Respondent 1nd her deceased husband, by a conveyance deed and recorded in 1947 through possession of all of
the land in dispute, and the evidence shows that the land was
cultivated, improved, and protected by substantial enclosure
during the twenty-one years that the Respondent owned said
land. The Appellants have not provided any evidence to the
contrary and should not now be heard to deny that the Respondent obtained the ground in question by adverse possession.

POINT III
THE APPELLANTS' ACT I 0 N, BASED UPON
MIST AKE, IS BARRED BY THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 78-12-26 (3), UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The Appellants' primary basis for this action is the theory
th;it the land in question w;is conveyed to the Respondent and
her deceased husband in ! 947 by mistake and that this mistake
Was committed by :i trustee and the mistake should therefore
be corrected by the Court not withstanding the passage of
more than twenty-one years since the alleged mistake.

8

The Respondent's reply to the contention of mistake is that
if a mistake had in fact been committed, the mistake had been
ratified by all of the heirs by the document entitled "Release
and Consent" heretofore referred to. Notwithstanding this
"Release and Consent'', however, the Appellants' contention is
without merit since the statute which bars an action based upon
fraud or mistake if brought after three years does not
distinguish mistakes committed by a trustee from mistakes
committed by someone other than a trustee.
Certainly, no such distinc-:ion was intended by the statute
and the Supreme Court of Utah in Parr vs. Zions First National
Bank, et al., 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P. 2d 461, held that a Statute
of Limitation is applicable and is effective in cases involving
guardianship and trustees as well as persons acting in their
own behalf.
Appellants deny that the Statute of Limitations referred
to is applicable in this case because they contend that the
mistake was not known to them until a very short time before
this action was commenced. The records contradict the Appellants' contentions, however.
The deed from the two sisters to the Respondent and her
deceased husband was executed and recorded on May 5, 1947.
The recording of the deed was sufficient under our statute to
give all third persons notice of the conveyance and notice was
at least constructively given to all of the Appellants by recording. Our recording statute reads:
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart noticeOperation and effect--lnterest of person not named
in instrument.-Every conveyance of real estate, and
every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real
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estate may be affected, to operate as notice to third
persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified
in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in
the office of the recorder of the county in which such
real estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding
between the parties thereto without such proofs,
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all
other persons who have had actual notice. Neither the
fact that an instrument, recorded as herein provided,
recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that
the gr:mtee in such instrument is designated as
trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to
be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating
the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge any third
person with notice of the interest of any person or
persons not named in such instrument or of the
grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey the
fee or such lesser interest as was conveyed to him by
such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument recorded
as herein provided setting forth the name of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the property ch:lrged with such interest.
Moreover, the Appellants were given actual notice in June
of 1953 of the conveyance which they now complain of. The
document entitled "Release and Consent" refers to "any and
all real property" inYolved in the original deed between the
mother and her two daughters and between the two daughters
and the Respondent and her deceased husband. By signing that
document, the Appellants admitted knowledge of the transaction complained of and indeed were given actual knowledge
and notice.
It is Respondent's contention that if in fact a mistake had
been committed, the mistake was ratified by all of the heirs
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by the "Release and Consent" signed by the Appellants and
recorded at the County Recorder's Office. Furthermore, it is
Respondent's contention that if a mistake had in fact been committed by the trustees and the mistake was not ratified by the
heirs, the Appellants are still barred from bringing this action
by the three-year Statute of Limitations.
SUMMARY
The Respondent submits that the Appellants' case is
barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations for fraud and
mistake, and further submits that the Respondent is entitled to
have title quieted in her under the Adverse Possession Rule,
and therefore the Lower Court's ruling should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH M. HISA TAKE
Attorney for Respondent
4 3 1 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

